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These budget expansions are evident in the
weapon acquisitions of the PLAN. The Chinese
navy is purchasing new anti-ship ballistic
missiles, anti-ship cruise missiles, land-attack
cruise missiles, surface-to-air missiles, mines,
manned
aircraft,
unmanned
aircraft,
submarines, aircraft carriers, destroyers,
frigates, patrol craft, amphibious ships, mine
countermeasures ships, hospital ships, and
supporting command, control, communication,
computers, intelligence, surveillance and
reconnaissance systems.107 In addition to this
new technology, maintenance, logistics, naval
doctrine, personnel quality, education and
training reforms have been implemented by
PLAN to modernize their forces.108

Chinese Naval Threat:
Growth and Modernization
Haley M. Halstead
The military evolution and modernization of
China’s navy highlight its increasing level of
threat to the United States. The power and
influence of the U.S. Navy are at risk, as are
U.S interests abroad. China’s naval growth and
strategic goals need to be examined in order to
establish a level of threat.
China’s navy has progressed significantly since
the 1990s,102 with current efforts to
simultaneously modernize and expand the
People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN).103 The
Chinese navy has shifted immensely in the
past two decades; it has progressed in
technological advancements as well as in size,
with astonishing speed. The PLAN is rapidly
becoming a force that can threaten the U.S.
Navy. Understanding the PLAN’s history,
growth and goals is essential to analyze their
threat to U.S. naval interests.
In the 1990s, China initiated a military
overhaul, thereby significantly expanding its
military budget.104 Naval expenses are
relatively transparent; the PLAN purchased and
continues to purchase new weapons and ships,
while training personnel to operate them.105
According to GlobalSecurity.org,
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Background photo: GlobalSecurity.org. Beijing Travel Blog,
http://blog.beijingholiday.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/06/china-money.jpg.

The Chinese military budget, at official
exchange rates, is one-seventh that of the
United States. But on a more appropriate
purchasing power parity (PPP) basis, the
Chinese military expenditure is about
$500,000,000,000, about three-quarters
106
that of the United States.

The overall naval goal of the People’s
Republic of China is to become the dominant
force in surrounding seas.109 Within that broad
spectrum, PLAN objectives include protecting
Chinese territory, enforcing Chinese policies,
eliminating the influence of the United States,
and displaying a strong projection of Chinese
military strength.110 According to Ronald
O’Rourke, a specialist in naval affairs, the
PLAN strives to be an “anti-access force,” a
strong enough force to discourage other
countries, including the Unites States, from
interfering in their affairs.111 This includes
deterring foreign diplomatic and military
interference. China’s desire for expanding its
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Taiwan.115
China
and
Taiwan
have
experienced high tension since the Chinese
Revolution in 1949.116 The U.S. should
consider China’s power and animosity for
Taiwan, especially in light of U.S. interest and
partnership with Taiwan. Chinese President Hu
Jintao declared that China desires to be a
“maritime power.”117 Bonnie Glaser, senior
advisor for Asia at the Center for Strategic and
International Studies stated, “This is very
significant language. It creates questions of
American capability.”118 Because of U.S.
partnership with Taiwan, Chinese naval forces
could pose a strategic risk to the Asia-Pacific
policy of the U.S.
In June 1991, Mount Pinatubo volcano
erupted in the Philippians, destroying the
evacuated Clark Air Base and requiring the
evacuation of Subic Bay Naval Base.119 The
evacuation of these bases signaled the
beginning of the end for a strong naval
presence in China’s surrounding seas.120 This
poses the possibility of future conflict with the
PLAN, as China’s naval progression is
consistently surpassing U.S. expectations.121
According to the National Intelligence
Director Michael McConnell, in the near future,
“China will be America’s only global competitor
for military and strategic influence.”122 China
has continually portrayed their military growth
as a protective and defensive measure,
attempting to show friendly intentions through

influence and control is apparent in their recent
port acquisitions. “China has either built or
reportedly planned to construct vital facilities in
Bangladesh, Cambodia, Maldives, Myanmar,
Pakistan, Seychelles, Sri Lanka, and
Thailand,”112 according to Patrick Mendis.
These strategic port locations, known as “a
string of pearls,” are strategically positioned
along trade routes leading from the Indian
Ocean to the South China Sea.113

Map: “China’s ‘String of pearls’ strategy to secure the ports of South Asia.”
Global Balita. http://globalbalita.com/?s=china+string+of+pearls.

In 2005, the Department of Defense
defined this “string of pearls strategy,” as a
…three pronged approach. First, China is
building a series of naval bases along sea
lanes to the Middle East; second, it is
strengthening
diplomatic
ties
with
countries in the region. Third, the Chinese
are rapidly building a blue-water navy,
developing advanced missile technology,
deploying
new
submarines,
and
stockpiling undersea mines to counter
U.S. Navy capabilities and protect their
114
energy security.
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An important issue for the U.S. to
consider is how China’s military goals might
incur negative relations between China and
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diplomatic relations with their neighboring
countries and the United States.123
There are two questions that U.S.
military leaders and foreign policy advisors
must address: 1) is China, based on their
military history and foreign policy, capable of
military expansion without conquering or
overpowering neighboring nations? 2) Is China
capable of continuing peaceful relations with
the U.S. once they become a force strong
enough to challenge U.S. hegemony? The U.S.
has always aided its allies when they face
overwhelming forces. Very soon, the United
States may be forced to choose between
reevaluating the way in which it supports its
allies and challenging the Chinese Navy.
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